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amended); and Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103 (1953 as amended), in the
Third judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge, presiding.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v,
Case No. 880155
Priority No. 2

JUAN DIOS CANTU,
Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
The Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts are set
forth in Appellant's opening brief at 1-5.

Mr. Cantu takes this

opportunity to reply to Point I of Respondent's Brief.

Mr. Cantu's

argument in regard to the arguments set forth in Points II and III
of Respondent's Brief is adequately set forth in Appellant's opening
brief.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
supplementing the jury panel.

Furthermore, the State did not follow

the required statutory procedure for challenging the procedure by
which a jury is empanelled and did not challenge the procedure on
direct appeal.

By failing to so challenge the procedure, the State

waived any argument it might have had that the jury was improperly
empanelled.

In addition, regardless of whether the trial court

erred in supplementing the jury panel, once the jury panel had been
supplemented, the prosecutor could not exercise his peremptory
challenges in a discriminatory manner.

ARGUMENT
POINT
(Reply to Rspondent's Point I)
MR, CANTU'S RIGHTS WERE PREJUDICED BY THE
PROSECUTOR'S EXERCISE OF HIS PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE,
A. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN SUPPLEMENTING THE JURY PANEL.
In its brieff the State relies on State v, Tillmany 750
P.2d 546/ 573-77 (Utah 1987) in support of its argument that "the
trial court's supplementation of the jury and the procedures used
were improper."

Respondent's Brief at 10. Respondent argues that

since this Court found Defendant's fair cross-section claim to be
meritless in Tillman/ the trial court in the present case erred in
finding that the fair cross-section guarantee was violated and in
supplementing the jury panel in order to overcome that violation.
Respondent's Brief at 11. R. 323-31.

Contrary to the assertions of

the State, the trial court in the instant case did not abuse its
discretion in finding that the fair cross-section guarantee was
violated or in supplementing the jury panel.
Utah Code Ann. §78-46-13 (1953 as amended) outlines the
procedure for drawing jury panels and the procedure to be followed
when a shortage of jurors occurs.

Utah Code Ann. §78-46-3(4)

provides:
If there is an unanticipated shortage of available
trial jurors drawn from a qualified jury wheel/
the court may require the clerk of the court to
summon a sufficient number of trial jurors
selected at random by the court from the qualified
jury wheel.
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In the instant case, the trial judge determined that
there were no members of a minority race on the jury panel, T. 63.
The Court also determined that the population of minority persons in
Salt Lake County was large enough to require two minority race
persons be on a jury panel.

T. 161. Although the record is

somewhat unclear, it appears that the trial court did not limit its
finding to Hispanics and suggested that the panel be supplemented by
one Hispanic and one person of another minority race.

T. 162.

Hence, the finding of the trial court was not limited to Hispanics,
but to minority persons in general.
The finding of the trial judge was reasonable in light of
the evidence presented to him at the hearing as well as his own
awareness as a result of being a member of a minority group. After
the judge determined that the fair cross-section guarantee was
violated, he supplemented the panel pursuant to the provisions set
forth in Utah Code Ann. §78-46-13(4) (1953 as amended).

He directed

the clerk of the court to select from the qualified jury wheel the
next two persons with minority surnames.

T. 162-3.

Hence, the

provisions of the statute were followed and the minority jurors were
randomly selected based upon where their names appeared on the jury
wheel.
Furthermore, the statute specifically limits the time in
which a party may move to stay proceedings or for other appropriate
relief on the ground of a substantial failure to comply with the
act.

Utah Code Ann. §78-46-16 (1953 as amended) states:
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(1)

Within seven days after the moving party
discovered, or by the exercise of diligence
could have discovered, the grounds
therefore, and in any event before the trial
jury is sworn to try the case, a party may
move to stay the proceedings or to quash an
indictment, or for other appropriate relief,
on the ground of substantial failure to
comply with this act in selecting a grand or
trial jury.

(2)

Upon motion filed under this section
containing a sworn statement of acts which,
if true, would constitute a substantial
failure to comply with this act, the moving
party is entitled to present testimony of a
jury commissioner, the clerk of the court,
any relevant records and papers not public
or otherwise available used by the jury
commission or the clerk, and any other
relevant evidence. If the court determines
that in selecting either a grand or a trial
jury there has been a substantial failure to
comply with this act, and it appears that
actual and substantial injustice and
prejudice has resulted or will result to a
paty in consequence of the failure, the
court shall stay the proceedings pending the
selection of the jury in conformity with
this act, quash an indictment, or grant
other appropriate relief.

(3)

The procedures prescribed by this section
are the exclusive means by which a person
accused of a crime, the State, or a party in
a civil case may challenge a jury on the
grounds that the jury was not selected in
conformity with this act.

The State failed to file a motion to stay proceedings or
for other appropriate relief or a sworn statement, both of which are
required in order to challenge a jury under the act.

On direct

appeal, the State also failed to challenge the selection procedure.
By failing to follow the provisions of the act, and by failing to
raise the issue on direct appeal, the State has waived any argument
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that may have existed regarding erroneous supplementation of the
jury panel.
B. ONCE THE JURY PANEL WAS SUPPLEMENTED,
THE PROSECUTOR COULD NOT USE HIS PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES IN A DISCRIMINATORY MANNER.
Regardless of whether the trial court erred in
supplementing the jury panel, once that supplementation occurred,
the prosecutor could not exercise his peremptory challenges in a
discriminatory manner.

The discriminatory use of the challenges

caused an equal protection violation regardless of whether the trial
court violated the statute in supplementing the jury.

A prosecutor

who violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
to the federal constitution cannot hide behind that violation by
arguing that a statutory error occurred.

In this case, where the

prosecutor did not formally challenge the supplementation procedure
as required by the statute, his subsequent violation of the equal
protection clause violated Mr. Cantu's rights, requiring reversal.

CONCLUSION
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant, JUAN
DIOS CANTU, respectfully requests that this Court reverse his
convictions and the matter remanded to the District Court for a new
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trial.
Respectfully submitted this

j~>

day of January, 1989.
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